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THERE ARE COALITIONS EVERYWHERE
Coalitions and side payments in the committees
under the open method of coordination in the
European Union
Peter Nedergaard
University of Copenhagen, Department of Political Science, Øster Farimagsgade 5, DK-1353
Copenhagen K, Denmark
ABSTRACT: Do members of the committees under the Open Method of
Coordination (OMC) find that there are coalitions of specific member states
in these committees? If so, then what kind of side payments hold these
coalitions together? For the first time in scholarly literature, and based on an
empirical investigation, the findings in this paper document that two
opposing coalitions  with the United Kingdom and France as the respective
leaders  exist in OMC committees where mutual learning is the raison
d’eˆtre. In the existing theory on this subject in the EU, it is claimed that
consensus decision-making leads to a weakening of coalition-building. All
three committees analysed in this paper build on consensus decision-
making, which is achieved after intensive meetings between all the
members. However, it is contended that the ‘argumentative contest’ working
method of the OMC committees leads to more  not less  coalition-building.
On the basis of a test, it is also shown that these committees are primarily
held together by side payments in the form of ‘promises relating to policy
among the like-minded’; however, ‘payments allied to subsequent decisions’
add to the cement of the coalition-building processes stemming from the
OMC working method.
Key words: European Union; side-payments; open method of coordination;
coalitions; committees
1. Introduction
In spite of the voluminous literature on the EU Open Method of
Coordination (OMC), no one has hitherto investigated the building of
coalitions in the committees comprising the foundation of this influential
method of cooperation between the EU member states.
DOI: 10.1080/14616690802326418 649
European Societies
11(5) 2009: 649/671
– 2009
Taylor & Francis
ISSN
1461-6696 print
1469-8307 online
A number of scholars have previously addressed general questions
regarding the coalitions and patterns of cooperation in EU decision-
making processes in general. Hosli (1996) analysed potential coalitions
based on power indices calculated according to the voting power of
member states in the Council of Ministers. Beyers and Dierickx (1997)
focused on the role of communication networks in informal day-to-day
negotiations between officials, finding that ‘only the North/South
division yielded significant results’ (Beyers and Dierickx 1997: 464).
Beyers and Dierickx (1998) concluded that nationality is an important
factor in establishing relationships in Council working groups. Both
papers by Beyers and Dierckx were based on interviews across a broad
spectrum of Council working groups, and their aims were to investigate
communication networks, not necessarily coalitions.
A study by Kaeding and Selck (2005) focused on the empirical
applicability of theories of coalition patterns based on power, interest,
ideology and culture in formal EU decision-making: the authors compared
the policy preferences of the member states, the European Parliament and
the European Commission in relation to 70 legislative proposals, and used
voting patterns in the Council of Ministers to map out policy positions
and coalitions among the member states. As can be seen, however,
Kaeding and Selck (2005: 279) included only hard law instruments with
binding legal effects; they did not explicitly include soft law instruments.
Ole Elgstro¨m et al. (2001) analysed coalitions in the negotiations among
officials in the EU decision-making process on the basis of an extensive
survey of Swedish EU committee members. They found a prevalence of
coalitions based on policy interests and cultural affinity. The OMC was
not, however, examined, and the exclusively Swedish group of respon-
dents was an acknowledged limitation to the research. As the OMC has
attained increased salience in EU policy-making, the dynamics of
coalition-building within it merit particular attention. Kaeding and Selck
(2005: 272) mention a further reason for investigating the subject which, at
the more general level, the author of this paper can only concur with: ‘Our
scholarly understanding of coalition patterns in EU decision-making is,
despite its importance, limited’.
This paper will focus on coalition-building in the soft law cooperation
of the EU, a previously untouched issue in scholarly literature. It is
predicted that coalition-building in soft law areas is likely to differ from
that in areas where hard law is the rule of the game. This likely difference
primarily stems from two factors.
Firstly, coalition-building in formalised arenas such as the Council of
Ministers is more likely to be linked with explicit voting rules where actors
are poised to focus on achieving a minimum winning coalition, for
instance if qualified majority voting takes place. This is the case even
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though traditional Council committees are also based on consensus.
However, this consensus decision-making often takes place in the shadow
of the possibility of future qualified majority voting (Nedergaard 2007:
160/74).1,2 Conversely, OMC decisions are made by consensus, implying
that the coalition patterns will remain less explicit. Whereas the traditional
Council committees are charged with the preparation of decisions on
directives and regulations in the Council of Ministers (i.e., hard law), the
OMC committees are responsible for enhancing mutual learning through
recommendations, benchmarking, best practice etc. (i.e., soft law). This
also means that coalition formation can be expected to assume different
forms within the OMC committees. Hence, coalition-building in this area
is likely to be governed by more fluid dynamics due to the lack of firm
coalitions behind either qualified majorities or blocking minorities.
Secondly, policy learning is the stated raison d’eˆtre of the committees in
the OMC area (see Nedergaard 2006). Some scholars reject policy learning
as a public logic that serves as a thin veneer over interest-based positions.
However, respondents in this survey report policy learning and, over time,
political actors tend to adhere to their public logic: reneging on such can
be costly in terms of political capital and loss of credibility. The dynamics
of coalition-building in the OMC area should thus be considered in
connection with policy learning as the overall logic in the committees.
All of the investigated OMC committees are based on consensual
decision-making, where recommendations are adopted and sent to the
Council of Ministers in one of its various configurations (ministers of
economics, employment, and social affairs).3 Before consensual decisions
are reached, however, an intensive and cumbersome debate transpires in
the committee meetings.
In Section 2 of this paper, the usefulness of coalition theories and
concepts for analysing the OMC processes will be examined. In Section 3,
hypotheses about the dynamics of coalition-building in the OMC
committees are established. Section 4 provides an operationalisation of
the hypotheses presented in Section 3. Section 5 describes the research
methodology, summarises the data and offers some preliminary results. In
Section 6, detailed data on the Employment Committee, the Economic
1. I distinguish between consensus and unanimity. Consensus is when all members of a
decision-making body passively accept a proposal. Unanimity is when all members of
a decision-making body explicitly participate in making a decision through a voting
procedure.
2. Cf. Riker (1962: 100). This is, however, not always the empirical outcome as other
factors such as ‘language, history, and general cultural characteristics’ are
determinants of EU coalition building in the Council of Ministers (Kaeding and
Selck (2005: 282).
3. See footnote 2 above.
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Policy Committee and on the Social Protection Committee is provided.
Section 7 considers the origin of coalitions in the OMC committees with
regard to the European politico-economic models, thereby offering a soft
test of the hypotheses. The conclusion of the article is presented in
Section 8.
2. Coalition theory and concepts for the analysis of the OMC committees
In the OMC area, policy learning is the stated raison d’eˆtre of the involved
committees (see Nedergaard 2006). Interest- or power-oriented scholars
will argue that the stated goals of the OMC only serve to obscure the
actual dynamics of the method, such as strategic bargaining. However, an
empirical analysis of OMC committees has concluded that: ‘Strategic
bargaining is not the general mode of interaction in the committees’
(Jacobsson and Vifell 2003: 19). The study also found that, in the case of
politically sensitive issues, contacts between members aimed at building
coalitions in the committees for bargaining take place prior to meetings
(ibid.). The interaction between the general modus of mutual learning and
bargaining on some particularly contentious issues means that the
dynamics of coalition-building in the OMC are worthwhile studying; in
this case, however, coalition-building differs from the precise definitions
of coalitions in the classical political science literature on winning, losing
and blocking coalitions, as in the ground-breaking book of William H.
Riker (1962: 255/6).
Moreover, the definition provided by Elgstro¨m et al. (2001: 113), where
a coalition is ‘a set of actors that coordinate their behaviour in order to
reach goals they have agreed upon’, implies that coordination takes place,
which is not always the case in the OMC. Rather, since the dynamics of
coalitions in the committees are also characterised by an ‘argumentative
contest’ (Jacobsson and Vifell 2003), a coalition is defined in this paper as a
group of actors subscribing to the same position or perceived to share the
same position by other actors. This definition is reflected in the data
collection.
Nonetheless, the classical concept of leaders and followers is regarded as
useful in this paper. In this investigation, actors in a coalition are often
referred to with reference to a specific member state acting as leader
within that coalition, as will be shown later (see also Riker 1962: 103;
Beyers and Dierickx 1998: 307). In addition, the difference in institutional
capacity between larger and smaller member states is likely to have an
impact on the probability that a given country will emerge as a leader of a
coalition (Beyers and Dierickx 1998: 309).
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At the same time, due to the fluid boundary between arguing and
bargaining in the OMC committees, especially in connection with the
issue of recommendations, actors are always assumed to be in the
process of building a potential coalition. Hence, coalitions might also
consist of members who have a looser or more marginal connection to
them. Consequently, contrary to traditional analyses (Riker 1962), and
due to the more fluid dynamics of the OMC processes, analysing
coalitions and coalition-building in these committees becomes one and
the same thing. This is also reflected in the data collection that this
paper is based on (see Section 5). Coalitions in the OMC committees
seldom materialise in the same manner as in organs where a voting
procedure could potentially take place at some point in the decision-
making process.
The concept of side payments is another notion from classical coalition
theory that is relevant to this paper, as it offers an analytical perspective on
the dynamics of coalition-building. While in common usage side payments
refer to money, it should be emphasized that in this paper they are
intended to denote ‘all artefacts and sentences (such as promises on policy)
that conceivably have value for members of the body’ (Riker 1962: 105).
According to Riker (1962: 108/14), the various kinds of side payments in
this context include:
1. The threat of reprisal: this type of side payment appears to belong only
to so-called police states in which coalition-building does not constitute
the main kind of decision-making.
2. Payments of objects, the value of which can be estimated in monetary terms:
likewise, these kinds of payments are not relevant for coalition-building
in the OMC committees, since decisions here have no immediate
budgetary implications.
3. Promises relating to policy among the like-minded: a prospective leader
typically starts with a proposed decision. A number of like-minded
members then join him/her immediately in support, thereby becoming
his/her followers. For these initial like-minded followers, the payment
will be the achievement of the proposed decision. This kind of payment
might be relevant in some cases in the OMC committees. Hence, one
likely logic stemming from coalition-building is that of achieving
solidarity among the like-minded.
4. Payments relating to subsequent decisions: if a leader of a coalition
concerned with one particular issue can reasonably be expected to play
the same role in a number of future resolutions, then he/she can
believably offer promises about subsequent decisions. Followers will
therefore support the coalition leader in the expectation of future
benefits, which in the case of the OMC committees becomes linked to
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the display of best practices. This kind of side payment is also relevant
to the OMC committees where the leaders of the coalitions are
normally the same (see below).
5. Payments relating to emotional satisfaction: this has nothing to do with
the like-mindedness highlighted under category (3). It is something
much more irrational, akin to Sigmund Freud’s description of leader-
ship as a kind of love affair between each follower and the leader, or
similar to Max Weber’s concept of ‘charisma’. This kind of side
payment might be relevant to OMC coalitions. However, they are
difficult to investigate using the methodology of this paper; hence, they
are not analysed here.
In sum, the side payments analysed in this paper as part of the coalition-
building process are either (a) promises related to policy among the like-
minded or (b) payments related to subsequent decisions.
In this paper, the specific questions are as follows: Do members of
the OMC committees find that there are coalitions of specific member
state representatives in the OMC committees? If so, then what kind of
side payments hold these coalitions together? Based upon responses to a
questionnaire distributed to the members of the three selected EU
OMC committees, answers to these two questions are provided in this
article.
The analysis will initially focus on the Employment Committee
(EMCO) and the Economic Policy Committee (EPC). An evaluation
will then be made of the pattern in the Social Protection Committee
(SPC). However, it should be noted that analysis of coalitions and
coalition-building in the SPC is more difficult due to the poorer quality of
available data.
These three committees were originally selected for several reasons: (1)
they have several years of experience in the elaborate procedures involved
in handling the OMC processes, thus rendering it possible to distinguish
possible coalitions; (2) their members have therefore also had the
opportunity of familiarising themselves with the detailed positions of
other member state representatives; (3) they represent a variety of policy
areas, from ‘hard core’ economics (EPC) through to ‘soft’ welfare state
issues (SPC), with EMCO covering the middle ground; and (4) they
represent EU policies springing both directly (employment policy in
EMCO) and indirectly (economic and monetary policy in EPC) out of the
EU treaty, as well as those that are not embedded in it (social protection
policy of the SPC). Admittedly, however, the three committees all serve
economic policy in the broad sense of the concept. In short, the selection
in this paper follows a similar research design.
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3. Hypotheses about side payments in OMC committees
Kaeding and Selck (2005: 273) derived four hypotheses concerning
coalitions in EU committees from the two most important approaches to
social enquiries, namely rationalism and constructivism:
1. A power-based hypothesis: coalitions arise among or with the most
powerful actors in terms of voting strength.
2. An interest-based hypothesis: interests form the basis of coalitions,
leading them to becoming more or less constant alliances in each
particular sector.
3. An ideology-based hypothesis: differences in ideology, such as a left/
right dimensions, pro-integrationists versus anti-integrationists etc.
lead to coalitions, and a repetition of patterns in different issue areas is
therefore predictable. Hence, coalitions can shift over time.
4. A culture-based hypothesis: differences in cultures / the ‘north vs.
south’ dimension being the most frequently mentioned / lead to
coalition formation which should therefore be expected to be similar in
different issue areas. Furthermore, coalition patterns based on culture
are expected to be quite fixed.
The power-based hypothesis is not relevant for this study when
interpreted in terms of voting strength. However, the fact that coalitions
appear to have a leader or a hegemon is a sign of power. For the purpose of
this paper, it is also difficult to distinguish between ideology- and culture-
based hypotheses. Instead, the first main hypothesis is that of the ‘most
similar’, which is a combination of Kaeding and Selck’s ideology- and
culture-based hypotheses.
The second main hypothesis partly draws on ‘interest-based’ partly on
the non-voting factors relevant to ‘power-based’, and finally on the very
nature of the work in the OMC committees. This is termed the ‘best
practice’ hypothesis, predicting that member states form coalitions with
member states with the best practice, the best indicators, the best
performance etc. in a particular area, because it is in their interests to
do so. This hypothesis is also underpinned by a study of the direction of
the learning processes in the EU OMC committees, which indicates that
members claim to learn from the member states that are the best
performers, not from the states that they like the most (Nedergaard 2006).
In conclusion, the two basic hypotheses about coalition formation in the
OMC committees are as follows. Coalition formation in OMC committees
depends on: (1) the degree to which member states share a similar
economic-political background (the ‘most similar’ hypotheses) and/or (2)
which member states can demonstrate ‘best practice’ (see Nedergaard
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2006). The prediction of the ‘most similar’ hypothesis is that coalition
formation takes place among member states with similar politico-
characteristics. The ‘best practice’ hypothesis predicts that coalition
formation proceeds across a group of member states sharing similar
politico-economic characteristics.
These two hypotheses can be linked to two different types of side
payments. The logic of achieving solidarity among the like-minded
(‘promises of policy decisions among the like-minded’) can be interpreted
as equivalent to the ‘most similar’ hypothesis, while the logic of offering
benefits to the unlike-minded rests on the display of ‘best practices’ in the
learning process; in other words, the unlike-minded join the coalition
because they expect to then be able to adopt the best practices on offer and
thus to benefit in some way or another. This implies that the ‘most similar’
hypothesis is a proxy for side payments as ‘promises relating to policy
among the like-minded’, and that the ‘best practices’ hypothesis is a proxy
for side payments as ‘payments relating to subsequent decisions’.
4. Operationalisation of the hypotheses
In order to progress in investigating which types of side payments are
predominant (and with a view towards analysing which EU member states
comprise the OMC coalitions), Ebbinghaus’ groupings, which are based
on the respective similarities and differences between the countries’
politico-economic backgrounds (Ebbinghaus 1999), are utilised in this
paper. Coalitions in the EU decision-making process are usually
categorised along vague (and sometimes inconsistent) north/south lines
(e.g., Hosli 1996; Beyers and Diereckx 1998; Elgstro¨m et al. 2001; Kaeding
and Selck 2005). Ebbinghaus’ categorisation is much more clear-cut, in
that the groupings are based on politico-economic attributes; they
therefore correlate closely to the selected OMC committees which in
turn demonstrate similar characteristics (economic, employment and
social policy). Furthermore, the advantage of using Ebbinghaus’ group-
ings instead of, for instance, those of Esping-Andersen (1999), is that the
former include more European countries.4 Most importantly for this
4. This article draws on the Ebbinghaus categorisation of the European countries in four
categories, in addition to which a fifth category including the new transition
economies has been added. This categorisation is one of many that have been
suggested in the literature on varieties of capitalism and types of welfare states. An
excellent overview of the different categorisations presented in the literature can be
found in Jackson (2002).
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analysis, Ebbinghaus’ categorisation is explicitly established in order to
analyse differences concerning politico-economic characteristics.
Unfortunately, Ebbinghaus’ analysis does not include all the EU
member states encompassed in this survey. In this paper, Luxembourg
has been added to the group of member states with a Central European
politico-economic model, and Malta and Cyprus to those with a Southern
European model. Ebbinghaus also does not include the Eastern and
Central European member states, with economies in transition, which are
in a separate category here (Table 1). Of course, this categorisation of all
the new member states (except Malta and Cyprus) is somewhat
problematic: they do not share the same politico-economic characteristics.
However, as far as the learning processes are concerned, they are all in the
same category, as they are all undergoing economic transformation from
centrally planned to mixed, European-style market economies. Moreover,
the EU has been treating these states in the same way with regard to
TABLE 1. European politico-economic modelsa
1. The Nordic model . Denmark
. Finland
. Sweden
2. The Central European model . Austria
. Belgium
. Germany
. The Netherlands
. Luxembourg
. France
3. The Southern European model . Greece
. Italy
. Portugal
. Spain
. Cyprus
. Malta
4. The Anglo-Saxon model . Ireland
. The UK
5. Economies in transition . Estonia
. Latvia
. Lithuania
. Poland
. Slovak Republic
. Slovenia
. Czech Republic
. Hungary
Source: Ebbinghaus (1999). Countries in italics have been added by the author.
aAccording to Ebbinghaus, France is in an intermediate position between the Central and
Southern European models, while The Netherlands occupies an intermediate position between
the Nordic, Anglo-Saxon and Central European models. I have categorised France as well as The
Netherlands as belonging to the Central European model.
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institution building (e.g., through the Phare programme) and trade
relations (e.g., through the Europe agreements).
The five politico-economic models can be characterised as follows:
1. In the Nordic economic model, welfare policies are based on the equal
inclusion of all citizens; rules are relatively simple and welfare
expenditure is high. This universalist welfare state also combines
welfare programmes with predominantly liberal-oriented economic
policies, and leaves most of the responsibility for the organisation of the
labour market to the social partners.
2. In the Central European model, welfare policies only include everyone
to a certain (relatively low) base level, since the selection criteria for the
distribution of welfare benefits are based on privileges such as
employment and seniority. However, in practice this kind of state is
often as expensive to operate as the Nordic type. The conservative
Central European model combines welfare policies with relatively
interventionist economic policies. This politico-economic model is
closest to the ‘coordinated market economies’ ideal type in the Varieties
of Capitalism literature (Hall and Soskice 2001).
3. The Southern European model shares numerous traits with the
Central European one. However, it differs by traditionally having an
even higher degree of state intervention in the economy, and a
relatively low degree of cooperation between the parties in the labour
market, which has contributed to the creation of an inflexible labour
market. The welfare states in this model emerged relatively late and are
not completely developed. Italy is in this category, while France is in an
intermediate position between the Central European and Southern
European models, since it also shares many traits with the countries in
the Central European category (Ebbinghaus 1999: 19).
4. In the Anglo-Saxon model, welfare policies are based on targeting
benefits to citizens with special needs. This type of welfare state is
relatively cheap. This model combines relevant selective welfare state
policies with fiercely liberal-oriented economic policies, and has a very
flexible labour market, in which involved parties have limited
influence. This politico-economic model corresponds to the ‘liberal
market economies’ ideal type in the Varieties of Capitalism literature
(Hall and Soskice 2001).
5. In addition to the Ebbinghaus groupings, there is a new group of
economies in transition consisting of the new member states from
Eastern and Central Europe that were all previously subjected to
planned economic systems. The grouping consisting of these states is
obviously the least solid, since no academic studies of the differences
possibly existing between the countries have been carried out. The idea
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behind the joint grouping is that all these new member states are in the
midst of a transition from a planned economic regime to a more
market-oriented one, and may therefore be expected to have somewhat
similar politico-economic backgrounds, as well as facing the same
challenges and problems (see above).
If coalition formation takes place predominantly within the various
European politico-economic models, it will be concluded in this paper
(based on the reasons given in Section 3) that ‘promises relating to policy
among the like-minded’ is the predominant form of side payment in
coalition-building in the OMC committees. However, if coalition forma-
tion takes place across the various European politico-economic models, the
conclusion will be (reasons given in Section 3) that ‘payments relating to
subsequent decisions’ are the predominant type. The testing relating to
side payments will be carried out in Section 6 after the presentation of the
data in the analysis.
The EPC is the oldest OMC-type committee. Its members discuss and
make recommendations on issues concerning the economic policies of the
EU member states. It has gained a higher standing since the full
implementation of the Economic and Monetary Union in the majority
of the member states.
The EMCO is the most well known OMC-type committee with the
most developed procedures in terms of annual reporting, detailed
recommendations etc. It is also the committee that has spurred most of
the significant scientific interest in the EU OMC (see Radaelli 2003;
Trubek and Trubek 2003; Jacobsson 2005; Pochet 2005; Zeitlin 2005).
The SPC was established in 2000 in order to discuss and make
recommendations pertaining to the social policies of the member states.
The working method in the SPC is the same as in EMCO; however, the
workload is somewhat smaller and the reporting slightly less exhaustive,
even though the frequency of meetings is higher (see below).
In all three OMC committees mentioned above, there is an elected
president from one of the member states, chosen from the committee
representatives. Generally, however, according to information gathered in
connection with this investigation, the presidents are regarded as relatively
weak, more like a chairman passing on the word than one setting the
agenda. Therefore the role of the president is disregarded in the following
analysis. The Commission, on the other hand, is often viewed as a more
powerful player than the presidents, sometimes even more so than the
strongest member states. At the same time, the Commission is normally
not connected to the coalition formation in the analysed committees, and
hence its role is also disregarded in this analysis.
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On average, the investigated OMC committee members have 7.3 years
experience in their respective fields. SPC tops the scale: its participants
have an average of eight years of experience in social protection issues.
However, the other two committees lag only a little way behind (EMCO:
7.1 years and EPC: 6.7 years). In this connection, it should be noted that,
at the time when the questionnaires were distributed, all the representa-
tives from the new member states had relatively limited experience in the
OMC committees, since they had only participated in them for about a
year before accession of their states on May 1, 2004 (see next section).
Hence, it is important to take into account the standard deviation
associated with the average amount of experience. In all three committees,
a small number of very practised participants create the impression of all
members having a similar level of practical expertise. In reality, many
participants only have between two and three years of service, while only a
few have served for a long time. Nevertheless, the working experience of
the members is assumed to be sufficient for them to evaluate the question
of coalition-building in the committees, even though the low response rate
of representatives from the new member states can be attributed to the fact
that they were relative newcomers when they responded to the
questionnaire (see next section).
5. Description of data and results
The analysis in this paper concerns the coalitions as identified by the
officials and experts in a selected number of EU OMC committees. The
data for the paper stem from a questionnaire distributed to all members of
the three selected committees.
The questionnaire was distributed electronically in November and
December 2005. From the outset, attempts were made to contact all 270
members and alternates in the three committees,5 the members of which
are all government officials. Representatives from the committee secretar-
iats present at the meetings are not included in the analysis. In accordance
with the definition of coalitions in this paper, committee members were
asked to respond to the following questions: (1) ‘To what extent is it usual
for two or more groups in the committee to disagree during discussions?’
and (2) ‘Will you name which countries are in the respective groups? / the
first group, the second group, etc.’. The committee members could also
add comments to these two questions and many did (see Section 3 above).
5. The questionnaire, the collected data etc. is available at the author’s homepage
www.cbs.dk/staff/pne
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Initially, an informative email with an attached questionnaire was sent to
all members. Several email reminders and telephone calls followed.
Ultimately, 158 of the 270 members or alternate members completed
the questionnaire and returned it, a response rate of 59 percent.
Respondents were only asked to complete the questionnaire if they
actively participated in the committee work, and the 59 percent are hence
likely to represent the most active participants in the committees.6 Some
did not answer all the questions, and only about half of them answered the
two questions about coalitions in the three committees, though with
significant differences from committee to committee, with the lowest
response rate being that of the SPC (see sections about the individual
committees below). All countries were represented among the respon-
dents; however, there was a slight over-representation of Northern
European member states and an under-representation of the new member
states.
The advantages and disadvantages associated with the use of ques-
tionnaires for collecting data are well known. If the response rate is high, it
is possible to cover a considerable number of people. Questionnaires
covering all members instead of a few in-depth interviews were chosen in
order to reach a large number of officials and to ensure that a much higher
percentage of opinions from OMC committee members about the
structure of coalitions in these committees would be attained. At the
same time, it is difficult to ascertain the seriousness of responses and avoid
strategic answering. On the other hand, since answers could be given
anonymously, these difficulties are not overly significant in this paper.
Moreover, this analysis is not about the content of the learning processes.
In addition, admittedly, the survey of the OMC committees only uncovers
coalitions at a single point in time. Even though they do change over time,
it should however be remembered that the coalition members have come
up with answers to the questions based on often relatively long experience,
cf. Section 4 above.
Table 2 contains some preliminary analysis pointing to a number of
tentative conclusions regarding the coalition patterns in the committees.
As illustrated in Table 2, fragmentation into coalitions has occurred to
‘some extent’ in all committees,7 the highest degree of which is seen in
EMCO (2.68) and EPC (2.77); the SPC (3.00) scores slightly lower on a
scale from 1 (very high fragmentation) to 5 (no fragmentation). The
6. The alternates occasionally participated in the committee work instead of the ordinary
members.
7. In the questionnaire, the respondents were asked directly about the fragmentation in
the committees, and they were asked to indicate the level of fragmentation (see the
questionnaire on my homepage: www.cbs.dk/staff/pne).
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variation between the SPC vs. EMCO and EPC exceeds the standard of
error but is lower than the standard deviation, rendering only tentative
conclusions possible. Hence, it would appear that the degree of
fragmentation into coalitions is greater in the EMCO and EPC than in
the SPC.
Respondents were also asked to place the member states into coalitions
if they believed that these exist. Table 3 shows the number of responses
given.
An analysis of how respondents place member states in coalitions
reveals different patterns for each committee. In the following sections,
these are analysed separately for each committee.
6. Coalition patterns in EMCO, EPC and SPC
All respondents indicate that either two or three coalitions exist in EMCO.
All but two respondents mention the United Kingdom as belonging to one
of the coalitions. The frequency with which the UK is identified indicates
that it has the strongest position and is hence the leader of the coalition.
Additionally, the UK is categorised together with Denmark seven times,
TABLE 2. Coalitions in the EU OMC committees?a
Committees Nb Mean S.D. S.E. of Mean
EMCO 50 2.68 0.868 0.123
EPC 32 3.00 0.718 0.127
SPC 56 2.52 0.894 0.119
Total 138 2.69 0.861 0.073
a1a high degree of fragmentation in coalitions. 5no fragmentation in coalitions.
bThe number of responses deviates somewhat from the number of responses indicated in Table 3,
as not all respondents have answered the question concerning the degree of fragmentation in
coalitions.
TABLE 3. Which Member States are in which coalitions?
Number of
members
Number of
responses to
the questionnaire
Number of
respondents that
have placed
Member States in
coalitions
European Employment Committee Around 90 56 16
Economic Policy Committee Around 90 64 37
Social Protection Committee Around 90 38 9
Total Around 270 158 (59%) 62 (23%/39%)
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with The Netherlands eight times, and to some extent with Ireland,
Sweden and the new member states, which are less consistent followers.
None of these followers is categorised as members of opposing coalitions
by any respondents (albeit Sweden once).
France is mentioned in connection with another coalition 11 times.
Similarly, respondents also group France as the country with the strongest
position and enjoying a leading role in the coalition. It is also grouped with
Belgium eight times, with Spain five times, with Luxembourg three times,
and sometimes with Greece or Portugal. None of these followers is
categorised as members of opposing coalitions by any of the respondents.
These two coalitions, with the UK and France as leaders, are mentioned
as the two first coalitions by almost all respondents. On the other hand,
there seems to be no clear pattern in the countries placed in the third
coalition by the five respondents indicating that a third one exists. One
mentions Sweden, Finland and Austria, another ‘Southern Europe’ (i.e.,
Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal).
Interestingly, Germany, another major player in the EU, is mentioned
only twice, and on both occasions not in coalition with any other
committee participant. This would appear to indicate that the German
representatives seek to engage in coalition-building to a very limited
extent. However, it is also consistent with Germany playing the role as the
quintessential compromise-maker, as often pointed out in the scholarly
literature on European integration (e.g., Dinan 2005: 74/80). As far as the
scant mention of Italy is concerned, one can only repeat what Beyers and
Dierickx (1998: 306) found during their research on networks in Council
committees: ‘Here is a big country . . . a long-time member of the EEC
and later the EC, which seems relegated to the pack of stragglers and
which seems to acquiesce to this status’.
As stated by one respondent who made a written comment: ‘UK,
Scandinavia/Nordic countries, The Netherlands and most new member
states tend to share positions on key issues. France, Belgium, Luxembourg
and to an extent Greece/Spain tend not to share the position of the UK,
etc.’.
However, two respondents mentioned that coalitions are not static and
tend to vary across issue areas.
In their analysis of 70 hard law legislative proposals, Kaeding and Selck
(2005: 281) also found two clusters as far as the preference patterns in EU
decision-making are concerned. This analysis was based on data from
before the 2004 enlargement. The first group included the UK, Sweden,
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Austria and The Netherlands. The second
encompassed France, Spain, Italy, Greece, Belgium, Portugal and Ireland.
The only major difference in the Kaeding and Selck groupings compared
to the analysis in this paper concerns the position of Ireland, which has
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traditionally been positioned in the ‘southern’ group but is located in the
UK-led group here (see also Hosli 1996).
Also in the EPC, two opposing coalitions clearly exist. In the first, the
UK, Sweden, The Netherlands and Denmark are the key players. They
are frequently joined by Finland and on occasion Ireland, Austria, Poland
and Slovakia.
In the other, France is consistently mentioned and appears to be the
country enjoying the strongest position. Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain,
Italy and Germany are frequently highlighted as collaborating with France.
Interestingly, France appears to be an all-important player, as it is not
only mentioned as part of a coalition in 33 of 37 responses, but also four
times in the coalition constellation ‘France’ vs. ‘most of the others’.
The analysis of the pattern in the SPC is slightly hampered by the fact
that only nine of the 38 respondents completing the questionnaire have
provided details of the coalitions they claim to exist.
The UK (mentioned by eight), The Netherlands (seven), and Poland
(five) are recognised as coalition partners. Marginal players in this
TABLE 4. Coalitions in EMCOa
Coalition Primary players Marginal players
Coalition 1 United Kingdom (14),
The Netherlands (8),
Denmark (7)
Ireland (3), Sweden (2),
‘New Member States’ (1)
Coalition 2 France (11), Belgium (8),
Spain (5)
Luxembourg (3),
Greece (2),
Portugal (1)
Possible ad hoc coalition(s) Sweden (1), Finland (1),
Austria (1), ‘Southern
Europe’ (2)
aThe respondents were asked to categorise the coalitions members primary players, secondary
players etc. See the questionnaire at www.cbs.dk/staff/pne
TABLE 5. Coalitions in EPC
Coalition Primary players Marginal players
Coalition 1 United Kingdom (28),
Sweden (17),
The Netherlands (15),
Denmark (13).
Finland (6), Ireland (3),
Austria (1), Poland (1),
Slovakia (1)
Coalition 2 France (33) Belgium (7), Luxembourg
(8), Spain (11), Italy (8),
Germany (7)
Possible ad hoc coalition(s) Poland (3), Italy (3)
Slovenia (2), Spain (2), etc.
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coalition are Slovakia (four), Denmark (three), Ireland (two) and Finland
(two).
The countries comprising the opposing coalition, France, Belgium and
Luxembourg, are all mentioned as members of the same one six times.
Other countries are also acknowledged as members of this coalition (i.e.,
Greece, Finland, Hungary, Spain and Portugal), though not more than
once or twice. Finland is the only country mentioned in relation to both.
One of the nine respondents indicated that the three coalitions are
‘welfare states’ vs. ‘more liberal countries’ vs. the new member states.
7. The origin of coalitions in the OMC committees
The two hypotheses in this paper are the ‘most similar’ and the ‘best
practice’. After the individual description of the committees in Sections 6,
7 and 8, the origin of the coalitions in the OMC committees using the
European politico-economic models presented in Table 1 will now be
evaluated. The result of the analysis is contained in Table 7, where
coalition membership is indicated when more than one respondent has
pointed out a state as being a member (C1 is the UK-led coalition, C2 the
French-led coalition).
In the EMCO, all members of Coalition 1 come from either the Anglo-
Saxon or the Nordic model, except for The Netherlands, which occupies
an intermediate position between those and the Central European models
(see footnote in Table 1). At the same time, the Coalition 2 members come
from either the Southern European or Central European model, while
France occupies an intermediate position between the two according to
Ebbinghaus (see footnote in Table 1).
Coalition 1 in the EPC also stems from either the Anglo-Saxon or the
Nordic model, with the exception of The Netherlands, which again retains
an intermediate position. Coalition 2 is made up of France as the primary
player, and the marginal players ascribe to the Central European and
Southern European models.
TABLE 6. Coalitions in SPC
Coalition Primary players Marginal players
Coalition 1 UK (8), Netherlands (7),
Poland (5)
Slovakia (4), Denmark (3),
Ireland (2) and Finland (2)
Coalition 2 France (6), Belgium (6),
Luxembourg (6)
Greece (2), Finland (2),
Hungary (2), Spain (1)
and Portugal (1)
Possible ad hoc coalition(s) None None
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In the SPC, members of the French-led coalition are from the Southern
European and the Central European models. The UK-led coalition mainly
stems from the Anglo-Saxon or Nordic member states, with the exception
of the intermediate position of The Netherlands.
In all of the committees, France and the UK generally appear to be
leading figures in opposing coalitions. Both appear to recruit members,
respectively, from the Southern and Central European politico-economic
model and from the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic models, with the exception
of The Netherlands (in an intermediate position).
The shape of coalitions in the EMCO and the EPC are very similar, as
the UK, The Netherlands and Denmark are central players in both. Some
minor differences exist with regard to the marginal players in the
coalitions. The same can be said about the coalitions in SPC, but (as
mentioned) the number of respondents here is relatively small. However, it
TABLE 7. Coalition members where more than one respondent has pointed to a coalition
membership
European
politico-economic
models
Member
states
Member of
coalition 1
(C1) or 2 (C2)
in EMCO
Member of
coalition
1 or 2
in EPC
Member of
coalition
1 or 2
in SPC
1. The Nordic model Denmark C1 C1 C1
Finland C1  C2
Sweden C1 C1
2. The Central European
model
Austria
Belgium C2 C2 C2
Germany C2
The Netherlands C1 C1 C1
Luxembourg C2 C2
France C2 C2 C2
3. The Southern
European model
Greece C2
Italy C2
Portugal C2
Spain C2 C2
Cyprus
Malta
4. The Anglo-Saxon
model
Ireland C1 C1 C1
The UK C1 C1 C1
5. Economies in
transition
Estonia C1
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
Slovak Republic C1
Slovenia C1
Czech Republic
Hungary C2
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is not possible to ascertain whether these minor variations are caused by
genuine differences or by the small number of respondents having
indicated that these countries are members of the coalitions.
This study therefore also confirms the picture outlined in Elgstro¨m
et al. (2001: 121), in which coalitions based on a north/south distinction
occur very often. However, this must be qualified and can be refined. The
Northern European member states stem from the Anglo-Saxon and the
Nordic models plus The Netherlands, whereas the Southern European
member states stem from the Southern European and the Central
European models. The new member states are, most often, marginally
connected to one of the two groups. Here, however, further investigation is
required.
Earlier in the paper in Section 3 on hypotheses about side payments in
the OMC committees, it was suggested that if coalition formation
proceeds within the various European politico-economic models, it would
be concluded that ‘promises relating to policy among the like-minded’ is
the predominant type of side payment in play. However, if coalition
formation takes place across the various European politico-economic
models, it would be concluded that ‘payments relating to subsequent
decisions’ are predominant. The soft testing of this paper has found that
the ‘most similar’ hypothesis has gained the greatest support and, hence,
the first type of side payment mentioned above will be regarded as the
most predominant type.
The only exception to that conclusion is The Netherlands, which has
from the outset been regarded as a member state in an intermediate
position between the various models (see Table 1 above).
The conclusion about coalition formation goes against the tendency as
far as learning processes in the OMC are concerned, where member
states appear to be learning across politico-economic models according to
which member states are the best economic performers (see Nedergaard
2006).
Interestingly, the coalition led by the UK appears to consist of the most
economically successful states. They are also the most important countries
from a teaching perspective. An interesting road to follow as far as
research is concerned is to investigate whether or not the UK-led coalition
also gains the upper hand in actual EU decision-making processes.
8. Conclusion
The research in this paper concerns an investigation into coalition-
building in the three selected committees working according to the open
method of coordination in the EU, an area previously neglected in the
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scholarly literature. Traditionally, theories of coalition formation treated
this as a game played between parties over Cabinet seats, and they all
assumed that parties were office-seeking rather than policy motivated. In
addition, even those theories assumed that a winning coalition, if it
existed, could form at any point in the policy space (Alt and Alesina 1996:
654/55). Recently, theories of coalition formation have mostly taken the
form of formalised spatial models (e.g., Tsebelis 2002).
The purpose of this paper is to take theories of coalition formation into
a different terrain, i.e., outside the field of government formation and into
areas where policy goals dominate, where actors are civil servants and not
politicians, and where coalitions consist of countries and not parties. The
research here therefore attempts to further the progress in the construc-
tion of a more general theory of coalition formation.
Two questions concerning coalition formation in OMC committees and
side payments were raised in this paper.
Based upon a questionnaire distributed to all of the members of the
three relevant committees, it was concluded that coalitions certainly do
exist in the Employment Committee and in the Economic Policy
Committee. Moreover, these committees appear to be overlaid with a
pattern in which one coalition is led by the UK and another by France.
The pattern of coalitions in the Social Protection Committee is much
more diffuse and less pronounced.
The analysis of the specific member state coalitions in the various OMC
committees was followed by an evaluation of the dominant side payments
which hold these coalitions together. In this context, the investigation
attempted to discover whether or not the coalitions have developed, as
predicted, from the various European politico-economic models according
to a certain pattern. If this was the case, it would be concluded that
‘promises relating to policy among the like-minded’ is the predominant
type of side payment involved. However, if coalitions were found to
originate within the various European politico-economic models, it would
be concluded that ‘promises relating to policy among the like-minded’
were of higher importance.
The test showed that ‘promises relating to policy among the like-
minded’ seemed to be the predominant type of side payments in the
coalition-building of the OMC committees. This is in keeping with the
research into other types of coalition formation, where culture-based
coalitions along north/south lines have been found (or hypothesised) to
exist (Hosli 1996; Beyers and Diercks 1998; Kaeding and Selck 2005).
However, this research has refined these former studies somewhat, and it
has been shown that coalition theory can fruitfully be implemented
outside its usual field.
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Through this analysis of new forms of international cooperation in the
OMC, it is hoped that it has been shown that coalition theory in political
science literature has a much broader application than has been previously
thought. There has also been an attempt to demonstrate that coalitions
sometimes have a much more ‘fluid’ character than that which is normally
analysed in classical coalition theory. In general, political and social
research should take more account of member state coalitions. If you can
find them in soft modes of governance, they are everywhere.
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